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INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 4492
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2765
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RUEHKS/AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE 3731
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE 7288
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4358
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 000687

NOFORN
SIPDIS

OSD/APSA FOR SEDNEY/HELVEY/BASALLA/GEIS;
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J3/J5/FPA
JOINT STAFF FOR J3/35
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J02/J2/J3/J5
CIA PASS ODNI

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [MARR](#) [KN](#) [KS](#) [JA](#)
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL COORDINATION (MARCH 26) ON
DPRK TD2 LAUNCH

REF: A. TOKYO 00445
[1](#)B. TOKYO 00446
[1](#)C. TOKYO 00579
[1](#)D. TOKYO 00633
[1](#)E. DCINTRON MARCH 26 E-MAIL TO STATE/EAP/J KELLEY
AND OSD/APSA/J BASALLA.

Classified By: Ronald Post, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 (b/d)

[1](#)1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The CDA and U.S. Forces, Japan Commander joined Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Bessho in co-chairing a March 26 meeting of the informal bilateral interagency group to coordinate actions associated with the anticipated DPRK launch of a Taepodong-2 missile. Following an intelligence and operations update, DVM Bessho reported that immediately following the launch the government of Japan will set up a task force, hold news conferences and have the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister phone U.S. and other counterparts. Follow-on diplomatic action will mostly occur at the UN. DVM Bessho assessed that that United States, Japan and South Korea are on the same page, but getting Russian and Chinese concurrence on actions and language will be difficult.

[1](#)2. (S/NF) Summary continued: On public messaging prior to a launch, the Government of Japan will emphasize the unlikelihood of the missile or debris falling on Japan, outline the prudent preparations Japan is taking in case it does, and assure the public that they should not feel threatened by the event. These messages will be conveyed by the Chief Cabinet Secretary following a March 27 National Security Council meeting. Japan's post launch public messaging will include information on the launch, an

assessment that it is provocative and in violation of UNSCRs, a condemnation demand for DRPK action, request for an emergency UNSC meeting, and possible sanctions. The CDA noted that we need to have firm responses that shows there are consequences for North Korea's actions while not closing the door to a future resumption of the Six-Party Talks. DVM Bessho responded that another round of Six-Party Talks is unlikely anytime soon as neither the DPRK nor Japan will be in the mood to engage in that forum. End Summary.

13. (S/NF) CDA Zumwalt and USFJ Commander Lt. Gen. Rice co-chaired with Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Koro Bessho the second meeting of an informal interagency group gathered to bilaterally coordinate actions ahead of the anticipated launch of a TD2 missile by North Korea. The U.S. side included the Deputy USFJ Commander and representation from USFJ directorates and the Embassy's Political, Public Affairs, Defense Attache, and National Geospatial Agency sections and the Director for National Intelligence representative. The Japan side included Director-General and General Officer representatives from the Cabinet Secretariat (Foreign Affairs and National Security/Crisis Management), Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Foreign Policy, North American Affairs, Asian and Oceanic Affairs, International Legal Affairs, and Intelligence and Analysis Bureaus), Ministry of Defense (Defense Policy Bureau) and Joint Staff Office (JSO) J3 (Operations).

Intelligence and Operations Update

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14. (S/NF) The Embassy's DNI Representative and the senior NGA representative started off the meeting by using Rel-Japan imagery slides to provide an overview of the DPRK's recent launch preparation activities, including stacking of the TD-2 on the launch pad. CIRO First International Affairs Department Director Yasuo Niimi reported that from 0900 on April 4 CIRO will stand up a taskforce to provide U.S. and domestic sourced intelligence on the launch to relevant Japanese ministries and agencies.

15. (S/NF) JSO J3 Lt. General Harukazu Saitoh (new to the position as of March 24) followed with an operational brief on Japan Self Defense Forces preparations. The Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces will operate two Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense destroyers in the Sea of Japan and one in the Pacific east of Japan. This deployment will occur prior to the issuance of the defense order, expected March 30 or 31, according to Ministry of Defense sources. Ground radars will be directed at the location of the launch pad. Following the defense order, Patriot PAC-3s will be deployed around Tokyo and the Tohoku area in northern Japan along the expected TD2 flight path.

16. (S/NF) USFJ J3 highlighted that the assets the United States deploys to the region will be focused on homeland defense. Two U.S. Aegis ships will be operating in the Sea of Japan and one to the east of Japan. The United States will share BMD data from the Shared Early Warning system and the AN/TPY-2 X-band radar located at Shariki, Aomori, Japan. The U.S. Seventh Fleet and the JMSDF are coordinating their activities and sharing information between Aegis ships. The data sharing will allow both U.S. forces and the JSDF to have a Bilateral Common Operating Picture. Now that the DPRK has stacked the missile, USFJ has activated its 24/7 Crisis Action Team and stands ready to exchange liaison officers with the JSO to expand upon ongoing routine bilateral coordination, USFJ J3 reported.

DVM Bessho Reports on U.S. Coordination Meetings

17. (S) DVM Bessho reported that he just returned from a good

set of meetings with U.S. senior officials in Washington, D.C., that focused on how to deal with the DPRK nuclear and missile issues following a TD2 launch. These discussions will continue on March 27 when MOFA Asian and Oceanian Affairs DG Saiki meets with his U.S. and Republic of Korea counterparts in Washington. DVM Bessho said he reaffirmed with his colleagues at Japan's Permanent Mission to the UN that the focus post-launch diplomatic coordination will be in New York as well as in the relevant capitals.

Post Launch Action by the Government of Japan

18. (S) DVM Bessho reviewed planned actions, such as setting up a task force, holding press conferences and diplomatic action that the Government of Japan will take immediately following the launch (Ref E contains Japanese non-paper). On the question of Embassy and USFJ participation in those events, both sides agreed that if the launch is successful or

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does not affect Japan directly, an early visit by the CDA to the Prime Minister's or Foreign Minister's office to show solidarity would be appropriate. However, if there is a need to conduct consequence management and deal with damage to Japanese territory, then the two sides would consider having the USFJ Commander join such calls. As for the immediate phone calls by the FM to his U.S. and ROK counterparts, those would likely be bilateral as opposed to trilateral conference calls, DVM Bessho said.

Assessment of the UNSC

19. (S/NF) On a post launch UNSC response, DVM Bessho assessed that the United States, Japan and the ROK are on the same page: a strong message that condemns Pyongyang's actions and UNSC action that has some "teeth." The difficulty will be getting Russia, and to a certain extent China, on-board. Japan plans to begin general discussions with Russia and China, although these talks will not get into specific language of a resolution. Japan has already been in touch with and received positive feedback from the United Kingdom and France. Japan has also contacted other non-permanent members of the UNSC to broadly educate them on the situation, DVM Bessho reported.

Pre-launch BMD Public Messaging

10. (S/NF) Turning towards conveying the right pre-launch message to the Japanese public, Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Kyoji Yanagisawa assessed that the probability of a malfunctioning missile or debris hitting Japan is very low. If the heretofore problematic first stage fails, it will do so over the Sea of Japan and not reach Japanese territory. The second stage -- the proven Nodong rocket -- is more likely to succeed, but should it fail, it and the attached payload will likely burn up on the way down as it is not designed to withstand the rigors of reentry. The PAC-3s deployed to the flight path region will handle anything substantial in the unlikely event that it survives re-entry into the atmosphere.

11. (S/NF) ACCS Yanagisawa said he gave this assessment to the Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister. He suggested that the public message should be that while the likelihood of something hitting Japan is low, the JSDF and emergency response services are taking precautionary and preparatory action, and the public should not worry but rather go about their daily lives. This same assessment and public messaging line will be discussed during a March 27 National Security Council meeting the PM is calling to prepare for the launch. ACCS Yanagisawa said the government does plan to announce the dispatch of the JMSDF Aegis ships and PAC-3s following the decision to issue a

defense order. (Note: Separately, MOD Defense Policy DG Nobushige Takamizawa told the Embassy that MOD has agreed to let the Cabinet Secretariat handle this announcement as well, vice the originally planned separate statement by the Defense Minister, in order to highlight the theme of public reassurance. End Note.)

¶12. (S/NF) USFJ Commander Lt Gen Rice agreed with this

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assessment and the message. MOFA North American Affairs DG Kazuyoshi Umemoto asked if the United States would be announcing the deployment of its naval ships and whether those assets are for U.S. homeland defense or for monitoring the launch. Lt Gen Rice said U.S. forces would continue to share detailed information in existing channels with the JSDF. However, the U.S. military will not provide public information on the location or operations of specific ships. The United States will continue to state that it is in a position to protect itself and, in accordance with its treaty obligations, its allies.

Post-Launch Messaging

¶13. (S/NF) ACCS Yanagisawa said the central government plans to inform local governments and the media about the launch as quickly as possible. The information will initially include the launch time and impact point of the first stage. This information would be derived from Japan Aegis destroyer radar tracks and not the Shared Early Warning System or other U.S.-derived sources. DG Umemoto asked how much information the United States will release following a launch. The CDA indicated this is under consideration in Washington.

¶14. (S/NF) Cabinet Secretariat Foreign Policy Counselor Hideki Asari provided an outline of Japan's planned public message immediately following a launch and asked for U.S. views (Ref E for full contents). Highlights of the five main points in the message:

- (1) Provide information on the launch and assurances that the government is taking necessary measures to ensure safety;
- (2) Categorization of the launch as a provocation, a violation of UNSCR and inconsistent with the Six-Party Talks;
- (3) Condemnation based on the above categorization;
- (4) Demand the DPRK comply with UNSCRs and take positive action to resolve abduction, nuclear and missile issues; and,
- (5) Lay out responses (including requesting an urgent UNSC meeting), cooperate and coordinate with the United States, ROK and other members of the Six Party talks

CDA Zumwalt informed Counselor Asari that we would send the outline to Washington for review (Ref. E).

DVM Bessho Not Positive on Six-Party Talks

¶15. (S/NF) CDA Zumwalt said the United States and Japan need to send a firm message to North Korea that there will be consequences for its actions. Longer term, however, we need to make sure we do not do anything that will foreclose a return to the Six-Party Talks table. DVM Bessho said he took the point, but assessed that the Six-Party Talks would not start up anytime soon. The DPRK will not want to engage in that forum and following the launch and Japan will also be in no mood to restart a dialogue with Pyongyang. That said, Japan is not looking to wreck the Six-Party Talks, DVM Bessho said.

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¶16. (S/NF) This message was cleared by USFJ and the Embassy's
DNI Representative.
ZUMWALT